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1. Introduction
‘Citizenship’ has frequently been a key concept of migration studies. It has
also become commonplace to feature the concept in welfare state studies, especially 
in the past ten years (e.g. Ferrera 2005). A Marshallian linear evolutionary view 
of citizenship is, however, no longer of much help in analysing European policy 
development. What we are witnessing in Europe is the transformation of the meaning 
of ‘citizenship’, not only concerning a person’s belonging to a certain political unit, 
but also regarding the benefits that person can expect from the state s/he resides in. 
This paper is an attempt to connect both aspects of this transformation.
Specifically, this paper builds on Christian Joppke’s hypothesis on the ‘lightening 
of citizenship’ (Joppke 2010a; 2010b). Our initial hunch is that the lightening of 
citizenship has a substantial impact on internal aspects of citizenship, namely what 
a state expects from its citizenry and what it guarantees in return. Taking recent 
social policy developments in Europe as an example, this paper contends that the 
lightening of citizenship entails both the universalisation and lightening of social 
policy. In other words, the lightening of citizenship coincides with the lightening of 
social security. 
As Joppke already suggests this point, this paper highlights the roles of EU 
institutions in this transformation. In particular, this paper features the EU judiciary’s 
leading role in this process and contends that judiciary-induced policy-making 
affects the content of policy. 
Substantially, we argue that the universalisation and lightening of social 
security corresponds to a functional requirement of the internal market, but it is 
also a plausible answer to the increasingly diversified and de-stylised career of EU 
2citizenry. In this regard, ‘lightening’ should be conceptually separated from mere 
‘retrenchment’ of welfare or ‘neo-liberalization’. This direction has been augmented 
by the intervention of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), whose judgements have 
built on union citizenship and enhanced individual social-rights protections.
This trend may be called a European style ‘rights revolution’, but it has a price. 
Featuring citizenship as a universal status protects individual rights, but puts the 
collective ordering of social relations, which had been an important part of social 
rights, in the back seat. Therefore, the paper contends that a new perspective on 
‘the individual versus the collective‘ is relevant to the analysis of EU social and 
employment policy.
After briefly clarifying the concepts used in this paper, we examine the 
development of EU social policy with an emphasis on the role of the ECJ and union 
citizenship. This section illuminates the individualistic aspect and reach of union 
citizenship. Against this background, we analyse four ECJ rulings and contrast this 
development with the ‘collective ordering’ aspect of social rights in Member States, 
taking Germany as the main example. The final section summarises our argument 
and its implications.
2. Preliminary Consideration
(1) Conceptual Clarification of ‘Citizenship’
The concept of ‘citizenship’ has different connotations, depending on authors’ 
disciplines and theoretical standpoints. In this paper, we use the term in narrow 
sense, concentrating on its legal aspects. From this perspective, citizenship is the 
‘right to have rights’, the fundamental status of a person to have a bundle of rights 
normally accorded to a full member of a given political community. 
The reason for this definition is that we intend neither to advance theoretical 
arguments for a normative conception of a better society nor to give a tour d’horizon. 
Rather, our aim is to analyse concrete EU social policy developments in relation 
to the ‘citizenship of the union’ as defined in Article 20 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This means that we treat the concept in 
a positivist manner rather than as a theoretical conception. 
Focus on the legal aspects of union citizenship is also justified by its nature. 
Considering the nature of the EU as a supranational polity, the nature of membership 
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in that entity can only be a narrow one. The broader meaning of citizenship and the 
rights and duties of each person differs in each Member State (cf. Pfeifer 2009). 
Therefore, in an analysis of the union citizenship, a narrow focus on its legal aspect 
is appropriate. Further, the development of union citizenship has owed much to ECJ 
judgements. Thus, it is natural to place its legal aspect at the centre. This point is 
further explored in the next subsection.
(2) Effect of ECJ Intervention
In the past twenty years, we have witnessed a growing field of interdisciplinary 
studies on EU norm/rule generation (for state of the art, see Conant 2007; Stone 
Sweet 2010; Vauchez 2008). Political researchers have begun to pay attention to the 
role of the judiciary in the European integration process, and some legal scholars 
have offered theoretical perspectives that touch on the central concerns of political 
studies, such as legitimacy and democracy (Stone Sweet 2004; Alter 2001; Weiler 
1998).
Many of those works, especially those by political scholars, ask why and 
how the ECJ has played such a prominent role in norm/rule setting, in contrast 
with the national experience, where the legislative branch is the central stage of 
norm formulation (Stone Sweet 2004; Conant 2002; Cichowski 2007). Recently, 
the Americanisation of European legal systems has also been lively debated (e.g. 
European Political Science 2008). 
The focus of this paper, although related to those issues, is different. We 
concentrate our focus on the effect of ECJ intervention on policy content1. It is 
true that judiciary may have substantial policy impact, but this does not mean the 
judiciary is just another political actor. In this regard, studies on American judicial 
politics offer a useful perspective. Silverstein (2008) contends in general terms:
There are instances in which language, legal forms, and legal frames shape and 
constrain political behavior[.] The narrowing, formalizing, and hardening of the 
terms of debate add up to what might be called juridification[.] (p. 2)
In a concrete analysis of the US social policy, he adds, ‘Although some Court rulings 
expanded access to welfare payments, the doctrinal frame in which these decisions 
were set limited their reach and scope’ (p. 108) Abraham contrasts this point with the 
4German case (2005: 9, note 24), noting the policy effects of the ‘rights revolution’ in 
the United States as follows: 
The individualistic and individualizing, apolitical side of rights and of the ‘rights 
revolution’ in the U.S. has been the subject of analysis by conservatives and 
radicals alike... The situation in Germany is still quite different, notwithstanding 
the enlargement of individual rights there over the past 30 years.
These authors suggest that ‘judicialisation’ in the United States entails a specific 
policy effect2. In our case, too, it can be hypothesized that intervention by the 
ECJ tends to favour a specific policy direction— protection of individual rights—
because the ECJ is a judicial and supranational actor, in comparison with political 
and national actors. As a judicial body, the primary task of the ECJ is to protect the 
rights of a person in a concrete case rather than to forge a collective compromise or 
decide future policy directions. Further, rights may be argued to be more universal 
and common in the Member States (cf. Krebber 2006). In addition, the ECJ needs to 
secure the ‘four freedoms’ and protect the individual rights it has enhanced through 
its expansive interpretation of European citizenship clauses. 
‘Citizenship’ plays an important role here. As is shown below, the ECJ has used 
the union citizenship introduced by the Maastricht Treaty as powerful conceptual 
leverage to pursue a transnational answer. For that purpose, the meaning of union 
citizenship should be universal and abstract. Thus the rights conferred on this status 
become individualist and universal. Then, if individual rights’ protections cover 
social rights, does this suffice to realise a social Europe? In the next subsection, we 
elaborate on that topic.
(3) Liberal versus Social and Individual versus Collective Dichotomies
The social dimension of the EU has been repeatedly discussed in the past 
twenty years. It is usually discussed within the dichotomy of ‘neo-liberalism’ and 
‘social Europe’ or community responsibility and Member State autonomy. These 
dichotomies capture an aspect of the issues confronting the European Union. 
However, they provide little guidance on several important cases. For example, the 
EU introduced the issue of anti-discrimination in many Member States (cf. Amiya-
Nakada 2007). Caporaso and Tarrow (2009) emphasise this point. How can we 
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understand this ‘social’ face of the EU and its ‘liberal’ face, such as the consistent 
denial of national subvention or the ban on national non-tariff barriers? 
Building on the argument proposed by Menedéz (2010), which contrasts 
individualistic rights with solidarity, this paper offers a new perspective from which 
to understand the political tension inherent in EU social policy. We propose to 
differentiate two elements of social rights. One is the ‘collective order’ element. This 
aspect of social and employment policymaking is shared by many, if not all, Member 
States. This element also constitutes the ‘form’ or the procedural characteristic of 
EU social policy most prominent in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union Articles 153–155. There is, however, an inherent limit in this regard. In 
Member States, courts can rely on a historically constructed, shared understanding 
of the desired social order. To the contrary, as a supranational actor, the ECJ cannot 
rely on a specific understanding of ‘collective order’, as there are different traditions 
among the Member States. The other element is ‘individual rights’ or citizenship, 
which is prominent in the content of EU social and employment policy and 
necessary for a well-functioning internal market. This element is further enhanced 
by the ECJ-induced policy development. As a result, the ECJ has a built-in tendency 
to give priority to the individual rights element. 
But the citizenship element potentially conflicts with the collective order 
element, in that the protection of individual rights may sometimes erode the 
foundation for solidarity of the collective order. For example, concerning the 
Swedish welfare state, Trägarth and Svedberg (2013) pointed out ‘the extraordinary 
breadth of social rights’ and ‘the equally stunning [...] lack of individual rights’ 
(223) and assert that ‘social rights in Sweden have primarily taken the form of what 
we call ‘collective social rights’—that is, ‘rights’ that are in a strictly juridical sense 
(individual, claimable, enforceable in a court of law) not rights at all’ (229). This 
means that a specific configuration of policy process, namely the leading role of the 
judiciary, affects the content of the policy. This is the theoretical point of this paper.
This inherent contradiction is manifest in recent labour cases, namely the Laval, 
Viking, Rüffert and Luxembourg cases. Through an examination of these cases and 
the responses of various political and social actors, this paper contends that the 
question is not whether Europe is liberal or social. Rather, the conflict is between the 
individual and the collective elements of social and employment policy. In the next 
section, we examine individualist policy developments in more detail.
63. The Effect of ECJ Judgements and the ‘Citizenship Turn’ of the 
EU Social Policy
We can find the elements of individualism and individualisation in EU social 
policy. Below, we will substantiate this argument with several examples. The role 
of the ECJ is instrumental in this regard, as individual ‘rights’ protection is suited to 
transnational adjudication, especially after union citizenship acquired the status of 
quasi-fundamental rights.
     
(1) Centrality of the ‘Four Freedoms’
Unlike the political processes of Member States, the EU policy process is 
characterised by the autonomy of each policy domain. This is due to the step-
by-step integration process and patchwork distribution of competence between 
the EU and Member States (cf. ‘Five Policy Modes’, Wallace 2010). Further, 
executive coordination, such as by a party government or president, is lacking. 
Still, without a doubt the construction of the common market has been the central 
policy concern throughout the integration process. In this area, the EU’s competence 
is comparatively wide, and its rule-enforcing power is strong. In particular, the 
realisation of the ‘four freedoms‘—the free movement of goods, capital, services and 
people—is powerful leverage against Member States.
These four freedoms were instrumental in the expansion of ECJ influence. The 
supremacy and the direct effect of EC law were made possible by these freedoms 
as the telos of integration. EU law must be prioritised because imported goods and 
services can be directly or indirectly disadvantaged without uniform interpretation of 
EU-wide rules.
In contrast, social policy may be the least integrated policy domain besides 
foreign policy. The Amsterdam Treaty is the most recent, major expansion of the 
EU competence. After the Nice revision, Article 3 of the treaty listing community 
activities only indirectly touches on social policy. In Chapter 11 on ‘Social Policy’, 
Article 137 stipulates community competence but with strict reservations, saying that 
the ‘provisions adopted pursuant to this article shall not affect the right of Member 
States to define the fundamental principles of their social security systems and must 
not significantly affect the financial equilibrium thereof’. Further, pay, the right of 
association, the right to strike or the right to impose lockouts are explicitly excluded 
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from community competence.
In short, the core of the Member States’ social security system is the least 
integrated policy area. This is because the economic disparities between the Member 
States are directly reflected in this policy area and the historically accumulated 
‘welfare regimes’ are hard to integrate due to their differences in ordering principles 
and methods.
(2) Union Citizenship and the Role of the ECJ
EU-level social policy initiatives are more prominent regarding problems related 
to the free movement of person and anti-discrimination. As the former is closely 
connected with the four freedoms, EU legislation on this topic began in 1958. The 
latter came to the fore in the 1990s. In both policy areas, the role of the ECJ has been 
decisive.
When the union citizenship clause was introduced into the Maastricht 
Treaty, few expected that it would bring about far-reaching change. It was even 
disappointing to some, as the original Commission idea of an autonomous status 
was rejected, and union citizenship was deemed ‘supplementary‘ to Member State 
citizenship. 
The unexpected influence of the union citizenship clause was created by the 
ECJ in the landmark case of Grzelczyk (Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR 
I-6193). In this judgement, the ECJ treated union citizenship as a fundamental status 
that can be directed against European or national regulations circumscribing foreign 
nationals’ rights. In subsequent cases, the ECJ widened the scope of application 
of the EU anti-discrimination norm from ‘workers’ in a narrow sense, to legally 
residing Member State nationals, and thereby recognised the right of social benefits. 
Further, the reach of the norm has deepened. While non-contributory social benefits 
are explicitly excluded in the text of EU social security coordination laws, the ECJ 
declared that what amounted to ‘social benefits’ would be decided by the ECJ itself, 
not by Member States. In effect, the ECJ has recognised recipients’ claims for non-
contributory benefits beyond Member States’ original intentions. These decisions 
have been justified in relation to the four freedoms, as the wide recognition of social 
benefits claims are said to facilitate the movement of workers or people.
In anti-discrimination policy, the impact of EU legislation is more direct. Soon 
after the Amsterdam Treaty took effect in May 1995, two directives, namely the 
8Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) and the Equal Treatment Directive (2000/78/
EC), were adopted. These directives have been referred to as ‘one of the most 
significant pieces of social legislation recently adopted by the European Union’ 
(Bell 2002, 384). They are the first specific anti-discrimination legislation of many 
countries. Further, the directives instruct Member States to set up National Equality 
Bodies or to enable some association to intervene in litigation on behalf of plaintiffs.
It should be noted here that these examples—social benefit rights for foreign 
Member State nationals and the anti-discrimination policy—show that EU social 
policy is active and visible in those policy areas where minimum protection of 
individual rights is at stake. Recent (soft) policy initiatives on social exclusion 
(Silver 2003) or the introduction of minimum income schemes (Francesco, Haux, 
Matsaganis and Sutherland 2009) can be read in this light. 
This trend results from the twin fundamental motors of EU legislation: the 
four freedoms and union citizenship. This policy direction is clearly stated in the 
explanation of a proposal for a regulation on the coordination of social security 
systems (COM (2003) 596 final):
     
Coordination rules are not just intended to ensure free movement for employed 
persons; they are also increasingly about protecting the social security rights of 
all persons moving within the European Union. Coordination must therefore be 
seen from the perspective of European citizenship and the building of a Social 
Europe. 
     
In other words, by securing a common social minimum for European citizen 
regardless of nationality, religion and other attributes, freedom of movement and a 
‘Social Europe’ become compatible. 
As for minimum income, the starting point is the 1992 recommendation of the 
Council (92/441/EEC, 24.6.1992) that Member States ‘recognize the basic right of 
a person to sufficient resources and social assistance to live in a manner compatible 
human dignity.’ In this recommendation, reference to ‘rights’ is declaratory, with 
the emphasis placed not on giving people concrete subjective rights but on Member 
States’ obligation to give due consideration to that aspect.
More substantive input was provided in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Spurred 
by the electoral success of social democratic parties across Europe, a new policy 
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paradigm emerged. It is often called the ‘social investment’ approach. This approach 
is distinguished from ‘the social protection logic of post-1945 welfare regimes as 
well as the safety-net stance of neoliberals’ (Jensen 2010). The Lisbon Strategy 
launched in 2000 is a part of this approach and is also visible in the composition 
of the policy community surrounding the European Commission (Amiya-Nakada 
2012).
After initial optimism in the Lisbon Strategy had faded, the future viability of 
the ‘European social model’ was discussed and a more job-oriented second cycle 
began. For fear of the ‘backlash’, Social Platform, the umbrella organization of 
the social policy NGOs, advocated for a strengthened EU role. Headlines in its 
newsletter read, ‘Focus on fundamental rights, not on models,’ and ‘It’s all about 
fundamental values,’ reflecting its strategy to use ‘rights’ as leverage. 
This tendency to use ‘rights’ as the main argumentative pillar continues. In 
response to the so-called social investment package published by the Commission in 
2013 (COM (2013) 83 final, 20.2.2013), European social policy NGOs again stress 
the point. For example, Social Platform said, ‘[A] fundamental rights approach is 
a precondition of such policies’ (2013). The European Anti-Poverty Network, a 
leading European social NGO, also emphasised, ‘The SIP must confirm a rights-
based approach and a commitment to universalism’ (2013, 7).
In this argumentation, references to the ‘rights’ are not declaratory but 
substantive, in the sense that they aim to establish the individual rights as justiciable, 
as is shown below: 
     
People should be able to enforce the right to an adequate minimum income. 
Consideration should be given to the introduction of a chapter on remedies and 
enforcement, that guarantees the defense of rights to all persons [...] and that 
allows organizations [...] to help these persons in judicial and administrative 
procedures (EAPN 2010).
From this development, we can clearly see a typical pattern of judicialisation: 
once the judiciary is active in a specific policy domain, societal actors begin to use 
judicial avenues as an effective bypass of the stagnant political route to realise their 
own agendas. Throughout this process, argumentation, strategy and the objective of 
the societal actor will also transform to a certain degree.
10
(3) Limits of the Union Social Citizenship
Universalised minimum protection based on the union citizenship clause might 
be a potentially breakthrough for the reconstruction of the ‘social’ at the EU level. In 
reality, the relationship with Member States’ existing social security systems has led 
to more of a clash than complementary or mutual reinforcement. Part of the reason 
is the liberalizing tendency inherent in EU policies. The failure of the constitutional 
treaty referendum in France is the most prominent example, during which not just 
the treaty, but also the infamous ‘Bolkestein’ service directive (Directive 2006/123/
EC) were criticised as ‘unsocial’. 
Still, there are examples where the EU has played the role of innovator or 
promulgator of social policy innovation as in cases of anti-discrimination or social 
exclusion. Even in these cases, EU policy initiatives are sometimes faced with 
reluctance or outright opposition from the trade unions or the centre-left parties. 
For example, in the discussion of the portability of supplementary pensions, Gerd 
Andras (SPD), then the parliamentary state secretary for the German Federal 
Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs, publicly criticised the planned directive 
as undermining the supplementary pension scheme in Germany. It is to be noted 
that he had been a functionary of the Union of the Chemical Workers (IG Chemie, 
Papier, Keramik), which negotiated with management the most developed system of 
supplementary pensions.
We contend that this kind of clash is due to the logical difference between EU 
social policy and Member States’ existing systems of social and employment policy. 
In other words, the clash is not just between the ‘liberal’ EU and ‘social’ Member 
States, but also between different conceptions of the ‘social’. As suggested above, 
EU social policy has a tendency to grant a right to minimum social protection 
to every individual. In that sense, it has the characteristic of social ‘citizenship’ 
regardless of nationality (cf. Giubboni 2008: 3)3. To the contrary, the social and 
employment protection system of each Member State is more than a collection of 
individual rights and entitlements. It is the result of historical compromise between 
societal groups and political parties. This aspect is highlighted in Esping-Andersen’s 
seminal book, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, in which welfare regimes are 
classified according to leading political groups and their inherent logic. In short, 
national systems are a kind of public order.
The rights-based nature of EU social policy (cf. Mabbett 2005) is strengthened 
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by the leading role of the ECJ in policy development. The judiciary of a given 
Member State may find a specific type of social order to be ‘their own’ order 
and make due consideration to it even in relation to an individual’s fundamental 
rights. Among the growing diversity of social systems and norms, the ECJ cannot 
afford this type of consideration. As the task of the ECJ is to determine a common 
framework for all Member States, it cannot rely on a specific understanding of 
public order. In this regard, individuals’ fundamental rights are useful and powerful 
instruments. They are common to Member States and can be used against ordinary 
(Member State) laws because fundamental rights are supposed to be superior (Höpner 
2008). In the next section, we will sketch concrete examples of this kind of clash.
4. Clash of Individualised Policy and Collectivist Order: Examples of 
the ECJ Judgements
(1) Four ECJ Judgements in Focus
In this subsection, we analyse four recent ECJ judgements (Viking, Laval, 
Rüffert and Luxembourg) and the political reactions to them. These judgements 
have been perceived as a severe blow to existing Member States’ social systems 
and invited criticism from different angles. Through an analysis of the judgements 
and the reactions to them, we try to illuminate the importance of the clash between 
individualistic social policy and collective order.
The background of the conflict is the Posting of Workers Directive (Directive 
96/71/EC). As a matter of principle, the free movement of persons and services 
makes it possible for a company to send workers to other EU countries under 
working conditions that fulfil only the minimum standards of the sending country, 
not those of the receiving country. As an exemption from this principle, this directive 
stipulates that the receiving country ‘shall ensure that ... the undertakings referred to 
in Article 1(1) guarantee workers posted to their territory the terms and conditions 
of employment ... in the Member State where the work is carried out’, as far as core 
aspects such as maximum work periods, minimum rates of pay or provisions on 
non-discrimination. The minimum conditions shall be laid down ‘by law, regulation 
or administrative provision, and/or by collective agreements or arbitration awards 
which have been declared universally applicable within the meaning of paragraph 8’. 
As can be imagined, which Member State rules fall within ‘the terms and conditions 
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of employment’ of this directive has been a source of conflict.
In Viking (C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Union Federation et al. 
v. Vikingline ABP et al. [2007] ECR I-7779), the ECJ recognised, on the one hand, 
the trade union’s right to strike and the prevention of social dumping as justifiable 
grounds for restriction of the four freedoms. On the other hand, the Court did not 
affirm the relevant action of the Finnish Trade Union and asked the referring (British) 
court to apply the proportionality principle in a concrete judgement on the relevant 
action.
In Laval (C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet 
 and Others [2007] ECR I-5751), the point was whether Swedish law implementing 
the directive was valid or not. The Swedish implementing law allowed social 
partners to define the minimum wage level, as is common with other rules regulating 
the labour market. In other words, one of the central elements of Swedish industrial 
relations was at stake. The judgement denied such implementation, and the striking 
actions of Swedish trade unions based on this understanding were deemed illegal.
In Rüffert (C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR 
I-1989), the government’s action as a contracting party was contested. German 
Land government of Niedersachsen made the application for collective agreement 
mandatory to the company accepting a public construction order. As the company 
did not apply this to its Polish subcontractor, the Niedersachsen sued the company. 
Referred by the German court, the ECJ determined that securing minimum working 
conditions through public contract was not an acceptable means defined by the 
directive and was therefore illegal.
Finally, in Luxembourg (C-319/06, Commission v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
[2008] ECR I-4323), the Commission sued the government of Luxembourg for 
improperly implementing the directive by putting unnecessary restrictions on the 
freedom of movement by applying a wage slide to the minimum wage or requiring 
a contact person for monitoring. The ECJ sided with the Commission, saying that 
compliance with the directive can be sufficiently monitored by the sending country 
and that only the minimum conditions had to be clearly defined.
Through these four cases, the limits of defensive actions by labour or the 
government against service provision by low-paid workers has been more precisely 
defined. The ECJ recognised trade union’s fundamental right to strike and accepted 
governments’ justifications of restrictions on the risk of social dumping, at least 
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as a matter of principle. Nevertheless, the legality of all the protective measures 
were denied because the minimum standard had to be literally minimum and clearly 
defined by law or a declaration of universal applicability, according to the ECJ.
     
(2) Political Reactions at the European Level
Of course, the trade unions and the left parties criticised these judgements. 
The European Trade Union Congress (ETUC) issued a declaration criticizing the 
judgements and advocating for the adoption of a ‘Social Progress Protocol’ to be 
attached to the Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament showed its concern in the 
resolution ‘Challenges to Collective Agreements in the EU’ (2008/2085[INI]). The 
European Council issued the ‘Solemn Declaration on Workers’ Rights, Social Policy 
and Other Issues’ in June 2009, but did not provide the impetus for further action.
The Commission did not take concrete action until a political initiative by 
President Barosso suddenly opened the prospect for changing the legal texts. One 
day before the investiture vote in the European Parliament on his second term, he 
held a three-hour plenary session to answer the Members of the European Parliament 
(MEP) in Strasbourg. It was said that he had secured roughly 350 seats out of 736 
and tried to reach out to the 184 members of the Socialist and Democrats (S & D) 
group (Simon Taylor, ‘Barosso makes last pitch to Parliament‘, European Voice, 
15.9.2009). In that effort, he promised revision of the Posting of Workers Directive:
     
I have clearly stated my attachment to the respect of fundamental social rights 
and to the principle of free movement of workers. The interpretation and the 
implementation of the posted workers Directive falls short in both respects.... 
And let me be clear: I am committed to fighting social dumping in Europe, 
whatever form it takes. (‘Passion and Responsibility: Strengthening Europe in a 
Time of Change‘, SPEECH/09/391, 15.9.2009) 
     
Still, the Directorate-General for Social and Employment Affairs was reluctant, 
given the controversial and delicate nature of the directive. In the roadmap submitted 
for impact assessment (Legislative Initiative on Posting of Workers, available at 
<ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/ 2011_empl_001_posting_
of_workers_en.pdf>), it was suggested that a new regulation, Barosso’s political 
priority, was almost impossible to pass. In its place, Monti Report suggested to 
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‘[c]larify the implementation of the Posting of Workers Directive and strengthen 
dissemination of information’ and ‘introduce a provision to guarantee the right to 
strike modelled on Art. 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 and a mechanism 
for the informal solutions’, namely minimum legislative action with informal co-
ordination and information sharing (Monti 2010, 68–70). Currently, a solution along 
these lines is being pursued.
     
(3) Reactions of Member States: Case of Germany
The reaction of the German public opinion had already been intense before the 
Rüffert judgement. The Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs organised a 
symposium in June 2008 entitled ‘The Influence of the Judgements of the European 
Court of Justice on the Labour Law of the Member States’ (BMAS 2008), inviting 
experts including an ECJ judge. More influential in the public discussion was 
the intervention of prominent public figures. Fritz W. Scharpf, a famous German 
researcher on the EU, published an essay with the provocative title ‘The Only Way 
Is Not to Follow the ECJ’ (Scharpf 2008) in a German Trade Union Federation 
magazine. In the article, he suggested a possible rejection of the doctrine of the 
supremacy of EU law. It was consonant with a similarly anti-ECJ essay, ‘Stop the 
ECJ!’, by former president Roman Herzog, although this was made in a different 
context. In this way, the role of the ECJ was highlighted.
On the occasion of debate on the Lisbon Treaty in the German Federal 
Parliament, the Left Party vocally opposed the judgements and the Lisbon Treaty. 
In contrast, the Greens took a clear pro-European stance. Jürgen Trittin, past 
environment minister of the Red-Green Coalition, said, ‘We need to make Germany 
Europe-compatible’ and criticised the incumbent government, saying:
     
[The Rüffert Judgement] is not a bad judgement. Rather, it is the consequence 
of the failure of the Grand Coalition. This judgement comes because the 
declaration of universal applicability cannot be issued to the collective 
agreement. (Deutscher Bundestag, 16. WP., 157. Sitzung, 24.4.2008) 
     
Social Democrats were on the defensive as a part of the government taking 
a ‘yes-to-the-treaty-but’ stance. After ratification by the parliament, however, 
the Social Democrats revised the course and issued a joint motion with the trade 
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unions urging the addition of a ‘social progress clause’ to the treaty (Für ein Europa 
des sozialen Fortschirtts: Gemeinsames Positionspapier von SPD und DGB; 
Deutscher Bundestag, 16. WP., 224. Sitzung, 28.5.2009, Plenarprotokolle, 16/224, 
24712B-24717C).
German sensitivity to the judgements can be partly explained by the quasi-
constitutional notion of Tarifautonomie, or the autonomy of social partners. The 
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany reads as follows in Article 9, 
Paragraph 3:
     
The right to form associations to safeguard and improve working and economic 
conditions shall be guaranteed to every individual and to every occupation or 
profession. Agreements that restrict or seek to impair this right shall be null 
and void; measures directed to this end shall be unlawful. Measures taken 
pursuant to Article 12a, to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 35, to paragraph (4) 
of Article 87a, or to Article 91 may not be directed against industrial disputes 
engaged in by associations within the meaning of the first sentence of this 
paragraph in order to safeguard and improve working and economic conditions.
     
The Federal Constitutional Court has interpreted this text to mean that the 
state delegates a core domain of the collective agreement system to social partners 
(Löwisch 1989). In its seminal judgement, the Federal Constitutional Court stated, 
‘The purpose of the collective agreements is to give an order to working life’ (BVerfG 
vom 18.11.1954. BVerfGE 4, 96ff, hier 108). 
This was not only a reaction to the state regulation of industrial relations in the 
Nazi period, but also an expression of critical reflection on the Weimar experience 
when autonomous conflict resolution did not function smoothly and governments 
were often forced to resort to compulsory arbitration (cf. Nautz 1985). Due to this 
historical background, (West) German industrial relations are characterised by 
the rare use of governmental instruments such as wage freezes. The declaration 
of general applicability, which may be invoked as substitute for governmental 
regulation, has been issued only sporadically. In short, the norm of governmental 
restraint in the regulation of industrial relations and autonomous rulemaking by 
social partners was established and firmly took root as a kind of constitution in a 
material sense.
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As the ECJ judgements were seen as a frontal assault on this quasi-constitutional 
norm, it is no wonder that the German public reacted with such sensitivity. In 
addition, as far as the Rüffert judgement was concerned, a similar law in Berlin was 
already sanctioned by the Federal Constitutional Court, which added further fuel to 
the fire.
     
(4) The Real Stake of the Conflict
Roger Liddle, a former advisor to Tony Blair, said that Scharpf’s ‘warning that 
the European project represents a judicial entrenchment of neo-liberalism needs to be 
treated with the utmost seriousness’ (Liddle 2008, 27). Although Scharpf’s argument 
was more nuanced, the ‘ECJ equals neo-liberalism’ thesis can be seen elsewhere, 
and Scharpf himself talked of ‘judicial deregulation’ in a later article (Scharpf 2010). 
Has the ECJ become neo-liberal? Theoretically, it is plausible to infer neo-
liberalisation from the eastern enlargement after 2004, as the new Member States 
with generally lower social security standards and looser regulations have more to 
gain from the liberalisation of the older Member States. Höpner (2009) proposed a 
framework to analyse the political influence of the ECJ judgements and suggested 
that the nationality of the judges may influence the decisions (see also Kelemen 
2011b). In fact, among the cases shown above, judges from the new Member States 
occupied more than half of the seats in Luxembourg (LV, MT, SL against AT, IT) 
and Rüffert (LT, PL, RO against FR, NE). Viking and Laval were judged by the 
Grand Chamber, which included only five judges from the new Member States after 
2004 among 13 in total. If we suppose some ‘older’ Member States, such as those of 
southern Europe or the UK, are rather liberal, it might be the case that the liberalisers 
dominate in the Grand Chamber, too. 
In the European Parliament debates, nationality is clearly discernible independent 
of the partisan left-right position (European Parliament Debates, 21.10.2010). On the 
one hand, an MEP from the German centre-right CDU said:
     
We need to say a clear ‘no’ to any kind of social dumping and a clear ‘no’ to 
attempts to create ‘letterbox companies’ intended to avoid minimum standards 
for pay and working conditions. Social principles must not be subordinated to 
economic freedoms.
     
Lightening of Citizenship and Its Implication for Social Policy.‘Social Security Lite’ in the Making? 17
On the other hand, a socialist MEP from Estonia supported the judgement, writing:
     
Unfortunately, the desire of several Western European trade union organisations 
to close markets to the new Member States once again will not help unite 
Europe.
     
This contrast surely lends plausibility to the ‘liberalisation by enlargement‘ 
hypothesis. However, from our perspective, the four judgements can be interpreted 
in line with previous judgements, especially those expanding social rights. In 
Viking, the court stated that ‘it is for the national court to determine whether the jobs 
or conditions of employment of that trade union’s members who are liable to be 
affected by the re-flagging of the Rosella were jeopardised or under serious threat’ 
(paragraph 83, emphasis added). This means that what can be protected against the 
four freedoms is the specific interest of individual workers (Kocher 2008). This 
corresponds to a series of anti-discrimination decisions that protected individuals’ 
social rights.
In Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg, the issue is almost the same: ‘What 
constitutes an enforceable minimum standard?‘ In Laval, the Swedish tradition of 
autonomous regulation of social partners was denied. In Rüffert, an indirect method 
of government procurement fell outside justifiable minimum. In Luxembourg, 
too, the blanket recognition of universally applicable collective agreements in 
Luxembourgian Law was found incompatible with the directive (paragraphs 62–69). 
All these indicate that the minimum standard must be transparent and therefore 
defined by a statutory law or universally applicable collective agreements with 
specific content. It is not about the substance of the minimum standard but the way 
the norm was established. 
Then, what is the source of the controversy? From our viewpoint, it is the 
individual-rights orientation and relative disregard for the collective-order aspects 
of those judgements. In the above-mentioned symposium convened by the German 
government, the representative of the Swedish Trade Union expressed his concern as 
follows, which illuminates our point:
     
[T]he ECJ did much more than necessary in the Laval case. Carefully developed 
balances in national industrial relations systems have been distorted. One should 
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keep in mind that EU has 27 different labour market models. They all reflect 
different balances of power between Capital and Labour. The ECJ will become 
largely unpopular as it moves delicately balanced power between the social 
partners in the Members States.
     
He added further:
     
This [is] in contrast with the so called continental models where the States have 
a more primary role in the regulation of the labour market. It appears as if the 
ECJ measures the Swedish (or Scandinavian) autonomous labour market models 
through a lens shaped by a continental view. (Speech by Claes-Mikael Jonsson, 
in BMAS 2008)
     
The criticisms made by Blanke (2008) resonate with this statement. One of 
his points is that the recognition of the right to strike by the ECJ is limited to the 
purpose of protecting the workers. In his view, trade unions should be given a larger 
role than that.
In contrast, the ECJ prioritises individual rights protection and sees the state as 
the standard setter. In the words of Loïc Azoulai, who spent three years in the ECJ as 
Référendaire in the Cabinet of General Advocate Poiares Maduro:
     
What is at issue, in the eyes of the court is not so much the substance of social 
obligations ...; it is the way these obligations are fixed.... The State alone is 
habilitated to define the social model applicable to all businesses on its territory. 
This condemns autonomous collective actions undertaken to the same end. 
(Azoulai 2008)
     
In Laval, the Court characterised Swedish collective agreements as ‘not 
public in nature but ... designed to regulate, collectively, the provision of services’ 
(paragraph 98). Different interpretations of the relationship between the ‘public’ and 
the ‘collective’ are being contested here. 
(5) Relevance of the ‘Individual Rights versus Collective Order‘ Perspective
As Obermeier (2008) insists, we should not read too much in those landmark 
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cases, as a subsequent fine-tuning is necessary to reach a consensus between the ECJ 
and the Member State courts. Then, what happens after Laval?
It seems that the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) tried to avoid 
total confrontation and searched for compromise. On the one hand, the FCC sent 
warnings to the ECJ. In its Lisbon Ruling (BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009), 
the FCC continued a circumspect argument presented in the Maastricht Ruling, in 
which the EU was characterised as Staatsverbund and a limit was set on European 
integration. In this ruling too, it was repeatedly suggested that the ultimate source 
of EU legitimacy lies in the Member States and the expansion of EU competence 
is allowed as far as the constitutional identity of Germany is preserved (Fischer-
Lescano, Joerges and Wonka 2010). 
On the other hand, the concrete criteria for judging the constitutionality of 
the Lisbon Treaty are rather lax. In fact, regarding the social dimensions of the 
EU, the FCC stance is rather conciliatory. With four judgements in mind, the FCC 
acknowledged the ECJ’s efforts by stressing its recognition of trade union rights and 
ignoring the more the controversial aspects of its decisions:
     
The Court of Justice of the European Communities, in particular, has for some 
years now interpreted citizenship of the Union as the nucleus of European 
solidarity and has further developed it in its case law based on Article 18 in 
conjunction with Article 12 ECT. This line of case law represents the attempt 
to found a European social identity by promoting participation of the citizens 
of the Union in the respective social systems of the Member States. (paragraph 
395) 
Finally, the case law of the Court of Justice has to be taken into account, which, 
admittedly, has until most recently given rise to criticism of a ‘one-sided 
market orientation’ of the European Union but has at the same time shown a 
series of elements for a ‘social Europe’. In its case law, the Court of Justice has 
developed principles which strengthen the social dimension of the European 
Union. (paragraph 398)
     
Thereafter, the FCC even takes the Laval case as an example of the ‘protection 
against social dumping‘ and states: ‘In its decision of 11 December 2007 [Viking], 
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the Court of Justice even established the existence of a European fundamental right 
to strike‘ (ibid.). Here, the ECJ looks like a guardian of social Europe.
In Mangold, where the German law on early retirement was deemed 
incompatible with the EU’s anti-discrimination directives, this stance was further 
maintained (BVerfG, 2 BvR 2661/06 vom 6.7.2010). The FCC tolerated the ECJ 
ruling, saying, ‘If the supranational integration principle is not to be endangered, 
ultra vires review must be exercised reservedly by the Federal Constitutional Court‘ 
(paragraph 66). It even said the following: 
     
[T]he Court of Justice has a right to tolerance of error. It is hence not a matter 
for the Federal Constitutional Court in questions of the interpretation of Union 
law which with a methodical interpretation of the statute can lead to different 
outcomes in the usual legal science discussion framework, to supplant the 
interpretation of the Court of Justice with an interpretation of its own. (Ibid.) 
     
It may be said that the FCC has been using the carrot-and-stick strategy with the 
ECJ. Still, the fact remains that the FCC has offered ground for compromise and 
encouraged the ECJ to recalibrate social and labour issues. 
Then, will the ECJ make concessions by limiting the scope of its controversial 
judgements? Although any answer would be speculative at the moment, the 
ECJ might respond with comity4. In Lufthansa v. Kumpan (C-109/09), an age-
discrimination case, the ECJ based the ruling on Mangold but refrained from 
precluding relevant German law, leaving discretion on substantial points to the 
national court with request for an EU-law conforming interpretation. Also in 
Rosenbladt (C-45/09), the ECJ did not preclude the German law that allows 
automatic termination of employment contracts under several conditions.
Nevertheless, our perspective illuminates one important issue for future 
developments: It is the ‘Tarifautonomie’ problematique. The word had never been 
used in the ruling or the opinion of the Advocates General (AG) until recently. In 
2008, AG Kokott from Germany used the expression for the first time, however 
quite peripherally. From 2010, AG Trstenjak (Slovenia) began to use the word more 
actively. In the opinion on Commission v. Germany (C-271/08), she tried to persuade 
the Court to recognize the notion of Tarifautonomie as a fundamental right, arguing, 
‘As I propose in this opinion, the right of collective bargaining and Tarifautonomie 
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are to be seen as parts of general principles of the EU law and therefore fundamental 
social rights (paragraph 4)’
In the ruling, the Court did not follow her argument and again prioritised the 
European public procurement rule over collective agreements. Indeed, it ignored 
the problematique totally, without touching on any point AG Trstenjak had made. 
Nor in Rosenbladt did the Court devote any discussion to AG Trstenjak’s efforts to 
introduce the Tarifautonomie concept.
Nevertheless, she again raised the point in another recent case (C-155/10, 
Williams and others). Further, yet another AG, Pedro Cruz Villalón (Spain), took up 
the point in a recent opinion (C-447/09, Prigge u.a.).5 
It is noteworthy that that these cases were sent from the German courts, which 
can be interpreted as an intentional move. The German Federal Labour Court sent 
three cases (C-297/10 Hennings, Prigge and Williams) to the ECJ and the Hamburg 
Labour Court sent one (Rosenbladt). Further, a judge in the Federal Labour Court, 
Karin Spelge, quite openly made this point in a German journal for labour lawyers:
     
 [O]ur understanding of Tarifautonomie is totally foreign to the ECJ. (Spelge 
2010, 222)
 
Only when the court in the last instance uses this procedure [preliminary 
reference] more intensively as before, we will make the ECJ more familiar with 
our view, especially the importance of Tarifautonomie for the wage setting in 
the German labour market. (Ibid., 223) 
     
To summarise, the distance between the German FCC and the ECJ on social 
issues is not as great as has been emphasised in political discussions. One of the 
remaining issues is the ‘collective order’ dimension of social rights, most clearly 
exemplified in the Tarifautonomie problematique. The German courts are clearly 
aware of this point and send the relevant cases to the ECJ, where a few judges 
serve as their ‘allies‘ for advancing this point. At the moment, the ECJ continues to 
disregard it altogether, which may indicate the relevance of our perspective.
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5. Summary of the Argument and Implication
Let us summarise our arguments. First, EU social policy has a specific 
characteristic. It aims at universal protection of social minimum regardless of 
nationality, sex or race. For this purpose, union citizenship has been quite instrumental. 
Second, in advancing this agenda, ‘creative’ ECJ judgements have played an 
important role. As a result of this judicial intervention, the emphasis on individual 
‘rights’ has been strengthened. This is due to the nature of the ECJ as judicial and 
supranational body.
Third, the real conflict in recent ECJ judgements is not ‘liberal versus social’ or 
‘integration versus autonomy’. The conflict is between two different aspects of social 
and employment policy: individual rights protection and collective public order. We 
have tried to demonstrate the relevance of this perspective through an analysis of four 
ECJ judgements and the subsequent political and judicial reactions. In particular, the 
Tarifautonomie problematique is a unique finding from this perspective.
As an extension of this argument, we may speculate that self-defeating logic 
is inherent in EU social policy. The more the EU tries to enhance the social aspects 
of integration with the help of the ECJ, the further the individualisation of social 
policy proceeds and the less stable the collective rule-making system becomes6. This 
can become a crucial problem for the EU, as the setting up of a corporatist-policy 
community is intended to bypass Member States’ resistance and to enhance the 
EU’s democratic legitimacy. With a weak basis of legitimacy and a high hurdle for 
political-consensus building in the Council, the judiciary-induced development of 
EU social policy may fall victim to its own (partial) success.
*Several different draft versions of the article had been presented at the Conference 
of the European Union Studies Association in Boston, March 2011, the General 
Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research in Reykjavik, August 
2011, the International Conference of Europeanists in Boston, March 2012, the 
Annual Meeting of the Japanese Political Science Association, September 15-16, 
2013 in Sapporo and the Conference of the European Union Studies Association in 
Boston, March 2015.
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Note
1 As a related argument, Mabbett (2011), who partially builds on the ‘rights revolution’ framework of 
American judicial politics, is insightful and thought provoking.
2  Tushnet (2008) argues that so-called strong-form judicial review may be less suited to the effective 
implementation of social rights than weak-form review. Schiller (1999: 4–5) traces the development 
of American labour law and argues that the ‘rights revolution’ helped to undermine the strength of the 
labour movement.
3  Other authors have expressed the specificity of the EU social policy as ‘rights-based’ (Mabbett 2005) or 
a ‘European Social Framework’ (Micklitz 2010). My formulation tries to illuminate other aspects of EU 
social policy, especially its emphasis on labour policy.
4  For an analysis of recent judicial dialogue between the ECJ and the German courts, see Mabbett (2010), 
especially pp. 4–11.
5  It is to be noted that these two AGs have studied law in German-speaking countries. AG Trstenjak 
earned her doctoral degree in Zurich and also studied in Vienna and Hamburg. AG Cruz Villalón spent 
two years in Freiburg for post-graduate research and was a fellow at Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin in 
2001/02.
6  Magnussen and Nilssen (2013: 241) argue that an individual’s motivation to participate in collective 
action may suffer as a consequence of judicialisation.
